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RECENT CASES
BANKRUPTCY-PROPERTY PASSING TO THE TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCYTESTAMENTARY TRUSTEE'S "RIGHT" TO COMPENSATION BEFORE ALLOWANCE-

A voluntary bankrupt was for fifteen years prior to adjudication, and still is, a
testamentary trustee of a million dollar estate, but has never filed a compensation claim for services rendered. The trustee in bankruptcy-under that section of the Bankruptcy Act vesting him, as of the date of adjudication, with
title to that non-exempt property of the bankrupt which was either transferable
or subject to lawful levy and execution prior to filing of the petition 1-sought
an order compelling bankrupt (I) to request allowance of commissions and
(2) to turn over that portion thereof earned prior to bankruptcy. Held, that by
local law a testamentary trustee's right to compensation before allowance is
inchoate and not property passing to petitioner under the Bankruptcy Act. In re
Furness, 7 F. Supp. 844 (E. D. N. Y. 1934).

While the federal statute provides in general terms that property of the
bankrupt capable of alienation prior to filing of the petition passes to his trustee,
local law is conclusive not only as to whether a particular interest of the bankrupt constitutes a property right, but also as to the possibility of levying upon
or transferring a definitely determined property right.2 In view of this, the
result in the instant case would seem legally unimpeachable, since New York
allows commissions as a matter of right to accounting testamentary trustees
only.' And while it is possible to apply for a tentative allowance prior to final
closing of the estate, ihe granting of the application, as well as the amount of
the allowance rests wholly in the discretion of the court. 4 To construe such a
possibility of recompense as falling within the meaning of "property" under
the Bankruptcy Act would do violence to the limitations the law has attached
to the word. But even if the court, in an effort to reach another result, had
defined the concept in its loose and popular sense, the eventual conclusion would
almost certainly have remained unchanged. Local precedent had determined
that a fiduciary's right to compensation, whether deemed "vested" or not, until
I. "The trustee of the estate of a bankrupt, upon his appointment and qualification, . . .
shall . . . be vested by operation of law with the title of the bankrupt, as of the date he
was adjudged a bankrupt, except in so far as it is to property which is exempt, to all . . .
(5) property which prior to the filing of the petition he could by any means have transferred
or which might have been levied upon and sold under judicial process against him. . .
Bankruptcy Act, §7oa (5), 30 STAT. 544, 565 (1898), 11 U. S. C. A. § iioa (1927).
2. Robertson v. Howard, 229 U. S. 254 (1913) ; In re Butterwick, 131 Fed. 371 (M. D.
Pa. 1904) ; it re Berry, 247 Fed. 700 (E. D. Mich. 1917).

3. Matter of Worthington, 141 N. Y. 9, 35 N. E. 929 (1894) ; Matter of Barker, 230
N. Y. 364, 13o N. E. 579 (1921).
4. Matter of Bushe, 227 N. Y. 85, 124 N. E. 154 (1919). See Matter of Miller, 23I App.
Div. 684, 686, 248 N. Y. Supp. 593, 595 (4th Dep't 1931). See also SURROGATS'S COURT Acr
§285, N. Y. Civ. PRAcTIcE (Cahill, 1931) 825. An interesting discussion of the nature of
the analogous right of a receiver to compensation is to be found in the case of In re Brown,
4 F. (2d) 8o6 (C. C. A. 2d, 1924) wherein the court declared: "When a receiver performs
services in connection with his trust, it is expected that he will be compensated therefor. The
amount of allowance, of course, rests in sound judicial discretion. . . . There was at least
a possibility of payment for the services rendered up to the time of the petition in bankruptcy,
and therefore an expectancy of an interest in the sum of money subsequently paid; that is a
possibility coupled with an interest." But Fischer v. Liberty Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 6i F.
(2d) 757, 759 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932) discussing In re Brown, states: ". . . all that we supposed we were deciding in that case was that the earned pay of a receiver might be assigned.
To this we agree, but in so far as the decision held that a receiver earns any part of his final
allowance until he has distributed the cstate, it now appears to us to have been an inadvertence."
(522)
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ascertained and liquidated at the times and in the manner authorized by law,
was unassignable on grounds of public policy. 5 Despite the logical legal inevitability of the result, however, the startling conjunction of facts-a very
large estate, a voluntary petition in bankruptcy, long service without application
for compensation, and continuance of service after adjudication 6-- drives home
the conviction that, as a purely practical matter, denial of the order unduly
prejudiced the rights of creditors.7 The court impliedly recognized this by its
probably futile suggestion that perhaps the bankrupt would not object to applying for an allowance on account and thereafter voluntarily turning it over to
the trustee in bankruptcy. The fact that such an answer was the only possible
legal solution to the problem furnishes merely another illustration of the substantive inadequacies of our bankruptcy law.

CONFLICT OF LAws-CouRTS-APPLICATION

v.

Tyson

OF THE DOCTRINE OF Swift
TO A DECISION OF A STATE COURT CONSTRUING A LIFE INSURANCE

POLIcY-Defendant delivered a life insurance policy to the insured in Virginia.
Defendant agreed to pay the insured a monthly income and to waive further

premium payments upon receipt of proof from the insured that he had become
totally and permanently disabled while the policy was still in force. A few
days before the date on which a quarterly premium was due, the insured became
physically and mentally disabled. Because of his incapacity he was unable to
notify defendant and to pay the quarterly premium. Defendant claimed that
the policy lapsed because of this failure. The insured's administrator brought
suit in a federal district court in Virginia. Held, that since no "general principle of the law of contracts of insurance" was involved, the Court would apply
the Virginia 1 rather than the "general or commercial law," and the plaintiff
could recover. Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Johnson, 55 Sup. Ct. 154 -(1934).
Although the Federal Judiciary Act I provides that "the laws of the several states . . . shall be regarded as rules of decision . . . in the courts of

the United States", under the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson 3 the federal courts
have refused to follow decisions of the state courts in controversies involving
"commercial" or "general" law. 4 Questions involving the law of insurance
have previously been determined in the federal courts by principles of this
commercial or general law.5 Since the state courts are divided concerning the
5. Matter of Worthington, 141 N. Y. 9, 35 N. E. 929 (1894).
6. Mere insolvency of a trustee in the absence of statute is generally insufficient ground
for his removal. The New York Legislature has established certain definite grounds on
which a testamentary trustee may be removed. See SURROGAT2s COURT ACT § 99, N. Y. Civ.
PRAcricE (Cahill, 1931) 740. Cf. Matter of Jung, 2o5 App. Div. 37, i99 N. Y. Supp. 122
(Ist Dep't 1923) ; Matter of Berri, 130 Misc. 527, 224 N. Y. Supp. 466 (Surr. Ct. 1927);
Matter of Clark, 136 Misc. 459, 241 N. Y. Supp. 520 (Surr. Ct. I93O).
7. The importance of continuance of service by an insolvent testamentary trustee lies in
the assurance it furnishes of careful scrutiny of past transactions by the other trustees. It is
thus a fairly strong practical indication that compensation will eventually be awarded for past
services.
I. The highest court of Virginia has held that compliance with such a provision was
excused under the present circumstances. Swann v. Atlantic Life Insurance Co., 156 Va. 852,
159 S. E. 192 (i931).
2. 1 STAT. 92 (789), 28 U. S. C. A. §725 (1928).
3. See i6 Pet. i, iS-ig (U. S. 1842).
4. See ibid.; Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 368, 371 (893) ; Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U. S. 349, 360 (i91o) ; Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown
& Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U. S. 518, 529-530 (1928).
5. See Carpenter v. Providence Wash. Ins. Co., 16 Pet. 495, 5Ii (U. S. 842) ; Von
Moschzisker, The Common Law and Our Federal Jurisprudence (1926) 74 U. OF PA. L.
REv. 109, 270, 367, at 287.
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effect of a provision similar to the one in question,6 it might be said that no rule
law
of construction has crystallized into a principle of general or commercial
7
which the federal courts will apply regardless of the state decisions. Therefore, as in previous cases, and as the Court indicated in the instant case, it may
have been persuaded to follow the Virginia rule "for the sake of harmony and
to avoid confusion, . . .

[since]

the question seems . . . balanced with

doubt." S But although the question may involve "the construction of a highly
specialized condition" in an insurance policy, the mass of cases from numerous
states cited by the Court would of themselves indicate that the problem was
one of considerable commercial importance. Therefore, since the chief justification for the rule of Swift v. Tyson has been the promotion of uniformity
9
of decision in at least the federal courts in the field of commercial law, the
Moreover,
case.
instant
to
the
applicable
rule would seem to be particularly
there was apparently already in existence a rule of general or commercial law
applicable to the present situation, since the Supreme Court and a lower federal
court have only lately held that compliance with an identical provision was a
condition precedent to recovery on the policy. 10 The decision of the Supreme
Court in the instant case, therefore, seems to be significant in further1 illustrating a recent reluctance 1 to follow the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION-CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF THE SHIP MORTGAGE ACT OF I920-In accordance with the terms of the
Ship Mortgage Act of 192o,' which provided for the creation of preferred
3
mortgages 2 enforceable in a proceeding in rem in admiralty, mortgages were
6. Cases collected in Note (193o)
(932)

68 A. L. R. 1389.

See RESTATEMENT, CONTRACrS

§ 301.

7. See Fordson Coal Co. v. Kentucky River Coal Corp., 69 F. (2d) 131, 132 (C. C. A. 6th,
1934) ; cf. Commercial Electric Supply Co. v. Greshner, 59 F. (2d) 512, 514 (C. C. A. 6th,
1932).

8. See Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U. S. 20, 34 (1883) ; Sim v. Edenborn, 242 U. S. 131,
135 (1916) ; Trainor Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 290 U. S. 47, 54 (933) ; Community Building Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 8 F. (2d) 678, 68o (C. C. A. 9th, 1925), cert.
dcnied 270 U. S. 652 (1926).
9. See Von Moschzisker, supra note 5, at 285; (1934) 82 U. OF PA. L. REv. 647; cf.
Frankfurter, Distributionof Judicial Power between United States and State Courts (1928)
13 CORN. L. Q. 499, 528.
IO. Bergholm v. Peoria Life Ins. Co., 284 U. S. 489 (1932); Egan v. New York Life
Ins. Co., 6o F. (2d) 268 (N. D. Ga. 1932), aff'd, 67 F. (2d) 899 (C. C. A. 5th, 1933).
ii. See Trainor Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 290 U. S. 47, 55 (933) ; cf. Burns
Mortgage Co. v. Fried, 292 U. S. 487, 495 (I934), (934) 83 U. OF PA. L. REV. 83.
12. In this connection the Court in the instant case (at 158) made this comment: "The
case will not be complicated by a consideration of our power to pursue some other course.
The sunonion ]us of power, whatever it may be, will be subordinated at times to a benign and
prudent comity."
1. 41 STAT. iooo-ioo6 (1920), 46 U. S. C. A. 911-984 (1926).
2. Prior to the Act, ship mortgages were of little value as security since they were inferior to all maritime liens. The J. E. Rumbell, 148 U. S. I (1893). In order to encourage
investment in the merchant marine, the Act established a preference in ship mortgage liens as
against all other maritime liens except those existing prior to the mortgage or arising out of
tort and liens for salvage, general average or wages. By the standard marine insurance policy, together with a protection and indemnity clause, the mortgagee can protect his preference
against practically all liens except those for wages. Miller, The Foreclosure of Vessel
Mortgages in Admiralty (1921) 70 U. OF PA. L. REV. 22, 23.
3. Original jurisdiction of suits involving preferred mortgages is granted to the federal
The tribunal
district courts exclusively. 41 STAT. 1003 (920), 46 U. S. C. A. 951 (1926).
formerly resorted to for the foreclosure of ship mortgages was equity. Bogart v. The John
Jay, 17 How. 399 (U. S. 1854). Where a mortgage debt was contracted for services rendered
to the ship, a maritime lien enforceable in the admiralty would exist independently of the
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executed on two vessels. Both mortgagor and mortgagee knew that the money
advanced was to be used for nonmaritime purposes. On default, suit to foreclose was brought in admiralty by the mortgagee and was resisted on the ground.
that the foreclosure of mortgages not related to maritime purposes was not
within the constitutional jurisdiction of admiralty. Held, that the Act was
constitutional as a valid exercise of the Congressional power to legislate in
cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. Detroit Trust Co. v. The Thomas
Barlum, 55 Sup. Ct. 31 (i934), rev'g 68 F. (2d) 946 (C. C. A. 2d, i934).
Although Congress has constitutional authority to legislate upon subject
matters within admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, 4 the historical limitations
upon that jurisdiction have generally confined the cases treated in admiralty to
those relating to ships in their actual use as instruments of navigation or to matters which in a direct way form a part of maritime commerce.5 On the theory
that ship mortgages do not constitute maritime contracts-since analogously to
contracts for the sale 1 or construction 7 of vessels they concern maritime activity only ultimately '--the usual assumption, prior to the Act, was that they
were not within the cognizance of admiralty courts.9 Particularly has the
mortgage been considered of remote maritime incidence where, as in the instant
case, there was no restriction against the application of the proceeds to nonmaritime purposes. 10 While a similar restriction was held to be immaterial in
the case of bottomry bonds and respondentia loans, 1 admiralty accepted jurisdiction there since the obligee of these instruments directly participated in maritime activity by conditioning repayment of the loan upon the successful outcome
of the voyage.12 The decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals that the Act was
intended to apply in only those cases in which the proceeds of the mortgage
were appropriated to maritime purposes-a conclusion not merited from its
terms-represents an attempt to uphold its constitutionality, while at the same
execution of the mortgage. The Hilarity, Fed. Cas. No. 6,480, at 142 (S. D. N. Y. 1829) ;
The Hunter, Fed. Cas. No. 6,9o4, at 951 (D. Me. 1833). A forum capable of extinguishing
other maritime liens, and thereby creating a mortgage preference, combined with the need for
a simple, expeditious and uniform proceeding, make foreclosure in federal admiralty courts
advisable. Miller, supra note 2, at 24.
4. The Constitution delegates to Congress the power to make all laws which shall be
"necessary and proper" under the provision extending the judicial power "to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction". U. S. CoNsT., Art. I, § 8 (18) ; Art. III, § 2.
5. The most explicit statements by the Supreme Court of subject matters within the
jurisdiction of admiralty are to be found in Insurance Co. v. Dunham, ii Wall. I, 26 (U. S.
187o), and Thames Towboat Co. v. The Francis McDonald, 254 U. S. 242, 244 (1920).
Other definitions are to be found in i BENEDICr, ADMIRALTY (5th ed. 1925) § 63; HUGHES,
ADMIRALTY (2d ed. I920) 18.
6. The Ada, 25o Fed. I94 (C. C. A. 2d, i918).
7. People's Ferry Co. v. Beers, 2o How. 393 (U. S. 1857) ; Thames Towboat Co. v. The
Francis McDonald, 254 U. S. 242 (1920).
8. For a criticism of the narrowness of this view see I BENEDICT, ADMIRALTY (5th ed.
1925) §§ 68,

69. See also

i VALIn,

COm.-MENTAIRE SUR L'ORDONNANCE DR LA MARINE DU

Mois D'AOUT I68I (2d ed. 1840) 112, 151; Morrison, The Constitutionality of the Ship
Mfortgage Act of 192o (i934) 44 YALE L. J. I, 17 et seq.
9. This view has been taken on the doubtful authority of Bogart v. The John Jay, 17
How. 399 (U. S. 1854). There is language to the same effect in The Neptune, 3 Hag. Ad.
129, 132 (Eng. 1834). Neither case represents more than uncontrolling dictum. The Nanking, 292 Fed. 642 (N. D. Cal. 1923).
io. See the opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals in the principal case.
ii. Bottomry bonds: The Draco, Fed. Cas. No. 4,057, at 1032 (D. Mass. 1835) ; The
Mary, Fed. Cas. No. 9,187, at 938 (D. Conn. 1824) ; 3 KENT, Co,MI. (04th ed. 1896) 361362. Contra: Knight v. The Attila, Fed. Cas. No. 7,881, at 755 (E. D. Pa. 1838). Resp mdentia loans: Conard v. Atlantic Ins. Co., i Pet. 386 (U. S. 1828) ; PARK, MARINTE I.SURANCE (3d Am. ed. 1800) 410.
12. For the nature of bottomry bonds and respomdentia loans, see I PARSONS, SHIPPING
AND ADMIRALTY (1869) 132, 165.
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time preserving the traditional American concept of admiralty jurisdiction."
The progressive attitude of the Supreme Court, however, has refused complacent abidance by useless strictures of historical dictation. In conformity with the
"general maritime law" recognized in other countries,'" the Court disregarded
the ends to which mortgage moneys are appropriated, and considered of sufficient maritime concern, for jurisdictional purposes, the greater interest that the
free hypothecation of ships will attract capital to the merchant marine by assuring investors of a preferred status. In so doing it has established a precedent
wisely reserving to it a power to qualify or supplement the nature of maritime
law which is as elastic as its definition of cases justiciable under the "due process" or "interstate commerce" clauses.' 5

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-LEGISLATIVE POWERS AND DELEGATION THEREOF
-VALIDITY
OF SECTION 9 (C) OF NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL RECOVERY ACTPlaintiffs sought an injunction to restrain defendants, federal officers, from
enforcing executive orders based on the authority granted by § 9 (c) of the
National Industrial Recovery Act, which authorizes the President to prohibit
the interstate transportation of oil produced or withdrawn from storage in
violation of any state law or regulation on the subject.' Held,' that since the
policy declared in § I of the Act is not sufficiently definite to provide a standard
for the execution of the President's authority,' § 9 (c) is invalid as an illegal
delegation of legislative power. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 55 Sup. Ct. 241

(1935).
The doctrine that Congress may not delegate legislative power to administrative or executive officers has long been regarded as a platitude of constitutional law. In spite of sporadic criticisms 4 and analyses I it has survived at
least in juridical language. Although a certain amount of delegation has in
13. The Act in no way suggests any requirement as to the use of the moneys borrowed
upon the ship mortgage, and its purpose would have been frustrated if it were made incumbent upon investors to discover at their peril whether the capital advanced was devoted to
maritime uses. The preferred status was intended to arise immediately, and without more,
upon the recording of the mortgage and its endorsement upon the ship's documents. It is
conceivable that in many cases the mortgagor would be unable to procure a loan unless he
applied at least part of it to extinguish a pre-existing debt owing to the mortgagee. (1933) 43
YALE L. J. 1172.
14. In so doing, the Court re-established the liberal standard asserted by Mr. Justice
Story, in DeLovio v. Boit, Fed. Cas. No. 3,776, at 443 (D. Mass. 1815), of following
general maritime law in determining the scope of admiralty jurisdiction and not the limits
of admiralty in England at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. Most European
countries have provisions for dealing with mortgages in the admiralty, CONSTANT, THE LAW

RELATING TO THE MORTGAGE OF SHIPS (1920)

Appendix A, 113, and appropriate legislation

to this end has long existed in England. 3 & 4 ViCr. c. 65 (840) ; 24 & 25 VICT. c. 10 (861).
I5. The need for such a definition may arise under other sections of this same Act as yet
not called into question. For an excellent discussion, inter alia,of the constitutionality of subsection N of the Act, which permits the mortgagee to bring suit in personam in admiralty
against the mortgagor for the mortgage indebtedness or any deficiency, see Morrison, The
Constitutionality of the Ship Mortgage Act of 192o (1934) 44 YALE L. J. I, 25.
I. 48 STAT. 195, 200, 15 U. S. C. A. § 709 (c)

(Supp. 1934).

2. Mr. Justice Cardozo dissenting.
3. 48 STAT. 195, 15 U. S. C. A. § 701 (Supp. 1934). The policy contained in § I of the
Act is declared to be, inter alid "to remove obstructions to the free flow of interstate and
foreign commerce", "to eliminate unfair competitive practices", "to avoid undue restriction
of production (except as may be temporarily required)" and "to conserve natural resources".
4. Cheadle, The Delegation of Legislate Functions (1918) 27 YALE L. J. 892, 921;
Duff and Whiteside, Delegata Potestas non Potest Delegari (1929) 14 CORN. L. Q. 168, 195;
Handler, The National Industrial Recovery Act (1933) i A. B. A. J. 440, 446.
5. Note (1933) 47 HARv. L. Rav. 85, 93-95.
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fact always been allowed,O and the quantity deemed innocuous has, due to
economic conditions, sometimes been very great,7 it was ostensibly never doubted
that a limit did, in the abstract, exist. The instant case, however, appears to
be the first definitive statement by the Supreme Courts holding that a Congressional enactment exceeds the permissible bounds of this judicially-imposed 9
restriction. While requiring a "primary standard", 10 "declared policy",", or
"intelligible principle", 12 promulgations the most indefinite have been held sufficient guides for executive or administrative discretion. 13 Some of these, as has
been observed, are no less vague than the criteria set forth in the NIRA. 14 In
any event, the prevailing and dissenting views in the instant case, although
reaching diametrical results, may be said'to spring from and proceed along an
identical theory, viz., that "Congress may confer quasi-legislative power upon
an administrative agency if it has established as far as is practicable the primary
purpose of the legislation, and has demarcated the limits of the power delegated
as fully as the circumstances permit".'-' The majority concluded that, the
grant being absolute and the concomitant standard quite broad, delegation here
is tantamount to abdication; 16 the minority argued that the whole is reasonable,
at any rate under present circumstances.' 7 Since this is merely difference of
opinion on a (theoretically) narrow issue-the existence of a workable standard
-it seems inadvisable, if not impossible, dogmatically to stamp one outcome
correct and the other erroneous. On the other hand, the result actually attained
impedes gratuitously the administration and enforcement of the NIRA; more6. See Wayman v. Southard, io Wheat. 1,43, 46 (U. S. 1825) per Mr. Chief Justice

Marshall; Parkinson, The New Tariff Act and Delegatwns of Legislative Power (1923) 9
A. B. A. J.177.
7.See Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 288 U. S. 294, 305 (1933).
8. See Black, The National Industrial Recovery Act and the Delegation of Legislative
Power to the President (1934) 19 CORN. L. Q. 389, 392; Carpenter, Constitutionality of the
KIRA and the AAA (1934) 7 So. CALIF. L. REV. 125, 126; Note (1934) 82 U. OF PA. L.
REV. 739, 743.
9. "No rule . . . prevents the delegation

.

.

.

through general statutes of the power

and duty to perform functions legislative in their nature." Cheadle, loc. cit. supra note 4.
The restrictive principle is generally regarded as incident to the "separation of powers" theory
of the Constitution. See U. S. CONsT. Art. I, § YL;Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.
S.394, 406, 407 (1928).
io. See Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S.470, 496 (19o4).
ii. See Mahler v. Eby, 264 U. S. 32, 40 (1924).
12. See Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S.394, 409 (1928).

13. Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. ig (U. S.1827) ("such number of the militia . . . as
he may judge necessary") ; Field v. Clark, 143 U. S.649 (1892) ("reciprocally unequal and
unreasonable", "suspend . . . for such time as he shall deem just") ; Buttfield v. Stranahan,
192 U. S.470 (1904) ("establish uniform standards of purity, quality and fitness") ; Union
Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U. S. 364 (19o7) ("unreasonable obstruction of navigation") ; United States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 5o6 (1911) ("such rules . . . as will insure
the objects of such reservation") ; Avent v. United States, 266 U. S. 127 (1924) ("interest
of the public") ; United States v. Chemical Foundation, Inc., 272 U. S. 1 (1926) ("in the
public interest") ; Radio Comm. v. Nelson Bros. Co., 289 U. S.266 (1933) ("public convenience, interest or necessity"). In Avent v. United States, supra, it was said by Mr. Justice
Holmes, at I3O: ". . . the requirement that the rules shall be reasonable and in the interest
of the public and of commerce fixes the only standard that is practicable or needed."
14. Dickinson, The Major Issues Presented by the Industrial Recovery Act (933) 33
CoL. L. Ray. 1095, IOO. For the opposite viewpoint see Maurer, Some ConstitutionalAspects
of the National Industrial Recovery Act and the Agricultural Adjustment Act (934) 22
Gao. L. J.207, 227.
15. Note (933) 47 H.Av. L. REv. 85, 94.
1i.Principal case at 248.

17. Principal case at 257, Mr. Justice Cardozo, dissenting.
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over, it creates a more or less rigid rubric from a hitherto infinitely extensible
principle. If practical effects, both immediate and ultimate, be considered, the
dissent would appear to embody an attitude at once more realistic and more
prescient.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-MINIMUM PRICE LEGISLATION-VALIDITY OF
STATUTE FIXING HIGHER MINIMUM SALE PRICE FOR WELL-ADVERTISED

BRANDS THAN FOR THOSE UNADVERTISED--The New York Milk Control Act 1
provided that the minimum sale price for well-advertised brands of milk should
be one cent higher than for unadvertised brands. The Milk Control Board
ruled that the Act should apply to four dealers, one of which was the Borden
Company, which filed a bill to enjoin its enforcement on the ground that it
discriminated unreasonably against dealers in well-advertised brands. The district court sustained a demurrer to the bill.' On appeal to the Supreme Court,
held, that the case be remanded and that complainant should be permitted to
prove that no such differential in milk prices existed prior to the statute. Borden's FarmProducts Co. v. Baldwin, 55 Sup. Ct. 187 (1934).
Although the Court purported not to pass finally upon the merits of the
case, it distinctly intimated that the statute is unconstitutional unless such a
differential can be proved to have existed prior to the statute. The district court,
in upholding the statute, took the much broader view that the statutory price
differential was not unreasonable, because it was necessary to prevent welladvertised dealers from matching prices with "independents" and thus forcing
the latter out of economic existence. 3 However, even if no price differential
existed before the price fixing enactment, it does not necessarily follow that
the economic welfare of the "independents" did not require one; for the nonexistence of the differential would, in all probability, have been caused by
attempts of well-advertised dealers to match prices with "independents" for
the very purpose of destroying them. There still remains, therefore, the question whether a legislature should be permitted to fortify certain members of a
mutually competing group in order to offset the greater strength of other
members of the same group. It has been held that where the greater strength
of certain members is due merely to their superior business acumen or business
efficiency, the legislature may not impose special burdens upon them; ' but where
their strength arises out of some unique form of business organization, 5 or
some unique mode of advertising, statutes imposing heavier taxes upon them
i. N. Y. CONs. LAWS (Cahill, Supp. 1934) c. I, § 258-q.
Borden's Farm Products Co. v. Baldwin, 7 F. Supp. 352 (S. D. N. Y. 1934).
3. The court purported to rest its decision on the ground that the purpose of the discrimination was to prevent the economic destruction of the "independents", with a consequent
concentration of all the business in the hands of a few large dealers, who might then, by
secret agreement, form a monopoly. The "monopoly" part of the argument appears, however, to be merely an excuse, rather than a reason, for the result reached. The court stated
that well-advertised brands of milk, although of the same grade and quality as the unadvertised brands, must be regarded as a different class of product, because the public believes that
it is of superior quality and is ready and willing to pay a correspondingly higher price for itthus revealing its desire to protect the "independents" quite apart from any desire to guard
against monopoly. 7 F. Supp. 352, at 354 (S. D. N. Y. 1934).
4. Cotting v. Kansas City Stockyards Co., 183 U. S. 79 (9ol) (where a tax was to apply
to only those stockyards whose annual business exceeded a stated amount).
2.

5. State Board of Tax Commissioners v. Jackson, 283 U. S. 527 (1931); see Liggett

Co. v. Lee, 288 U. S. 517 (1933) (in both of which a heavier tax was laid on "chain" stores
than on other stores).
6. Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U. S. 342 (1916) ; Tanner v. Little, 240 U. S.
369 (1916) (in both of which a tax was laid on those merchants who advertised by giving to
customers coupons or trading stamps with each purchase, which were redeemable in cash or
in merchandise).
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are valid. In the instant case, the economic strength of the well-advertised
dealers is not due to their superior business acumen or efficiency, but to their
ability to advertise on a large scale over a fairly long period of time; and the
ability to do this is, in turn, made possible by the accumulation of sufficient
capital to finance such an advertising program. Whether the legislature should
be permitted to curtail the power to destroy competition by price-cutting, where
the source of the power is the accumulation of large amounts of capital, directly
brings into play the issue of "paternalism" versus "rugged individualism". The
-language of the instant case suggests a preference for the latter.7 But a recognition of the legislature's power to enact even non-discriminatory price legislation necessarily involves a recognition of its power to strike at the power to
destroy competition by price-cutting. And since the Court has recently, in
Nebbia v. New York, 8 upheld the validity of such legislation, the language in
the instant case appears to conflict with the principles underlying that decision.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-RIGHIT OF LAND GRANT COLLEGE TO EXPEL CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS FOR REFUSAL TO TAKE COURSE IN MILITARY TRAINING
AS REQUIRED BY STATE STATUTE-The Morrill Act ' granted land to the states,

the proceeds of which grants were to be used for establishing colleges in which
military tactics must be taught. A local statute 2 established the University of
California, provided that any resident of California should have the right to
enter the university, and required every student to study military tactics. Appellants, students in the university having religious scruples against military
training, were expelled solely for refusing to study military tactics. The university affords education such as cannot be had elsewhere in California except
at greater cost, which appellants were unable to pay. Appeal to the Supreme
Court was taken from a judgment of the California Supreme Court denying
appellants' reinstatement, on the ground that this violated the "privileges and
immunities" ' and "due process" 4 clauses of the Constitution, and was a denial
of the guarantee of religious freedom.5 Held, that the judgment be affirmed.
Hamilton v. Regents of the University of California,55 Sup. Ct. 197 (1934).
The general power of a state to prescribe the terms under which state
education shall be offered is well recognized.6 Under this principle, a recent
7. At p. i89, the Court expressed a fear that the statute would deprive dealers in welladvertised brands of the advantages of advertising which, it says, is not only lawful, but has
generally been commended and fostered. However, since the statute would not prevent such
dealers from taking advantage of their well-advertised names by selling milk of a given
grade at a higher price than would be possible if it were not well-advertised, it does not
deprive them of all the benefits of advertising, but merely of the power to use it for the purpose of destroying competitors by price-cutting.
8. 2oi U. S. 5o2 (1934).

(1862), 7 U. S. C. A. §§ 301-308 (1927)
Cal. Stat. 1867-3868, c. 244.
3. U. S. CON.ST. Amend. XIV.
4. U. S. CoNsT. Amend. XIV.
5. U. S. CoNsT. Amend. I.
6. Waugh v. University of Mississippi, 237 U. S. 589 (,915) (statute prohibiting fraternities in state schools) ; for a discussion of this case in the lower court see (913) 62 U. oF
PA. L. REv. 343; North v. University of Illinois, 137 Ill. 296, 27 N. E. 54 (1891) (requirement of state college compelling all students to attend chapel) ; Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn.
305, 289 S. W. 363 (1927) (statute prohibiting teaching of evolution in public schools) ; see
Turck, State Control of Public School Curriculum (1g7) 15 Ky. L. J. 277.
I.

2.

12 STAT. 503
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Mlaryland decision' determined that conscientious objectors may be expelled
from a land grant college solely for refusal to study military tactics. However,
the state's power is subject to the limitation that its exercise must not be unreasonable, 8 nor in contravention of constitutional rights,' nor discriminatory."
The customary exemption of Quakers from the study of military training in
land grant colleges does not constitute discrimination, since such exemption is
not a constitutional right, and in the absence of a statutory provision, could not
be legally enforced." In the instant case, appellants sought education at the
public's expense, and were not compelled to do so. Their privilege to attend a
state-supported college was not an absolute one guaranteed by the Constitution,
but was conditional upon compliance with regulations imposed by the state.'2
Moreover, it is well settled that religious freedom does not transcend a paramount interest of society. When public authorities enact a law which they
deem necessary for the welfare of the people, no religious sect may claim exemption by reason of its religious differences alone. 13 The decision rests on
sound legal logic. Since resort to the courts is now finally precluded, the reInaining remedy is amendment of state statutes such as the one here involved,
so as to make military training optional rather than compulsory. 14
7. University of Maryland v. Coale, 165 Md. 224, 167 Atl. 54 (933), appeal dismissed
sub nom. Coale v. Pearson, 29o U. S. 597 (1933). The persuasiveness of the Coale case as
authority is somewhat lessened by the following quotation from the opinion (at 236, 167 AtI.
at 59) : "The facts disclosed by the record seriously if not successfully assail the sincerity
of Ennis Coale in his assertion that in refusing to take the prescribed military training he
was actuated by conscientious religious convictions."
8. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 39o (1923) (statute forbidding teaching of foreign languages) ; Hardwick v. Board of School Trustees, 54 Cal. App. 696, 2o5 Pac. 49 (192) (expulsion from public school for refusal to take dancing) ; State ex reL. Kelley v. Ferguson, 95
Neb. 63, 144 N. W. 1039 (94) (expulsion from public school for refusal to take domestic
science) ; see JOHNSON, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS (1934) 173-178.
9. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923) (statute forbidding teaching of foreign
languages) ; Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 5io (925) (statute requiring all children
to be sent to public school) ; JOHNSON, CHURCH-STATE REATIoPsips (934) 179-I82; Cf.
Miami Military Institute v. Leff, 129 Misc. 481, 22o N. Y. Supp. 799 (Buffalo City Ct. 1926)
(requirement of private college that student attend church not of his denomination).
io. See Ward v. Flood, 48 Cal. 36, 56 (1874) (statute requiring separate public schools
for colored children) ; State ex rel. Weaver v. Ohio State Uniyersity, 126 Ohio St. 290, 297,
185 N. E. 196, 199 (0933) (state college requirement that colored students reside in separate
quarters).
i. University of Md. v. Coale, 165 Md. 224, 167 Atl. 54 (1933) ; FREUND, POLICE PoWER
(0904) 5O1. The doctrine that exemption of conscientious objectors is not a constitutional
right arose in cases denying naturalization to those who refused to agree to bear arms in case
of war. United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U. S. 644 (i2q) ; United States v. MacIntosh,
283 U. S. 6o5 (193) ; Note (1929) 3 U. OF CIN. L. REV. 462.
12. Cf. Waugh v. University of Miss., 237 U. S. 589 (1915)
(statute prohibiting fraternities in state schools).
13. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145 (1878) (Mormons not exempt from statute
punishing polygamy) ; Silverberg Bros. v. Douglass, 62 Misc. 340, 114 N. Y. Supp. 824 (Sup.
Ct. 3909) (Jews not exempt from Sunday laws) ; Ferreter v. Tyler, 48 Vt. 444 (3876)
(Catholic children not excused from attending public school on Catholic holy day) ; FREUND,

POLICE POWER (3904) 500.

14. In 1923 Wisconsin passed an amendment providing that the military training course
iu its land grant college shall be elective. WIs. STAT. (0931) § 36.15. Minnesota followed
suit in 1933. The action proceeded upon the belief that the Morrill Act, 12 STAT. 503 (1862),
7 U. S. C. A. §§ 301-308 (927), only requires a land grant college to offer its students a
course in military tactics, but not to compel them to take the course. 36 OPs. ATTY. GEN.
(1930) 297; Colby, Military Training in Land Grant Colleges (3934) 23 GEo. L. J. I. But
see Johnson, Military Training in Land Grant Colleges; is It Optional or Mandatory? (1929)
24 ILL. L. REv. 271. No case has ever decided the issue, and the Court in the instant case ex-

pressly refused to do so.
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CONTRACTS-OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE-PROVISION FORI PAYMENT OF INFORMER UNDER ESCHEAT STATUTE AS OFFER OF UNILATERAL CONTRACT-A

statute provided that "... any person who shall first inform the Department
of Revenue . . .that any escheat has occurred . . . and who shall procure
necessary evidence to substantiate the fact of such escheat, and shall prosecute
the right of the Commonwealth to the property escheated with effect, shall be

entitled to one-quarter of the proceeds of the property . . ,,1 Plaintiff properly informed the secretary of revenue that an escheat had occurred. After
plaintiff had acted in his capacity as informer for over two years, the secretary
of revenue refused to recognize the plaintiff as informer. 2 Held, that the
plaintiff's rights rested on contract and since the state had prevented complete
performance, plaintiff could r,;cover the statutory sum. Miles v. Metzger, 316
Pa. 211, 173 Atl. 285 (1934).
Whether rights arising under a statute providing for compensation for
acts done in response thereto rest on contract depends on whether the legislature
contemplated contractual relations.3 There is some support for the proposition
that the informer's right to compensation follows on a non-contractual basis in
the analogy to cases holding it unnecessary that the claimant to a reward know
of the existence of the offer at the time he apprehended a criminal, if the reward
be offered by statute.4 This doctrine, so clearly opposed to the fundamentals
of contract law,5 may be explained on the ground that courts feel that the
entire contemplated benefit to society has been attained and that the claimant
should not be defeated by rigid application of concepts.6 But bounties given
by statute for the killing of predatory beasts 7 and for enlistment in the army "
are said to be contractual offers. There seems to be no reason for denying
that the informer has an action proceeding on a contractual ground if it be
remembered that the statute is designed to encourage the giving of information
which might otherwise be withheld. Contract theory, which here better secures
the informer by creating a legally protected interest, tends to promote the
giving of the information and accords with the legislative intent. But since the
statute calls for acts, rather than a promise, the offer is unilateral and, under
orthodox contract law, revocable before complete performance. 9 The instant
court treated the contract as bilateral upon the giving of the information, the
other acts being conditions to the plaintiff's right to recover, and held that
these conditions were excused by the state's prevention of performance.' 0
i. PA.STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1931) tit. 72, § 1304.
2. A few days after the information had been given a will was probated appointing an
executor and disposing of a small part of the estate. The secretary of revenue chose to take
the property under an act providing a method for obtaining property in the hands of a fiduciary. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1931) tit. 72, § 1314.
3. Commonwealth ex re. Henry v. Gregg, I Dauph. Co. 203 (Pa. 1894) held an analogous
statute providing for informers' fees in eseheated estates to be a contractual offer.
4. Auditor v. Ballard, 9 Bush 572 (Ky. 1873) ; Smith v. State of Nevada, 38 Nev. 477,
151 Pac. 512 (1915) ; see Board v. Davis, 162 Ind. 6o, 69 N. E. 68o (1904).
5. Williams v. West Chicago St. R. R., 191 Ill. 6Io, 61 N. E. 456 (igOi) ; RESTATEMENT,
CONTRACTS (1932) § 53; ANsoN, CONTRACTS (Corbin's ed. 1919) 29, 3o, n. 1.
6. Auditor v. Ballard, 9 Bush 572 (Ky. 1873) at 575: "If the offer was made in good
faith why should the state inquire whether appellee knew that it had been made. Would the
benefit to the state be diminished . . .?" See Note (1916) I CORN. L. Q. 92.
7. Ingram v. Colgan, io6 Cal. 113, 38 Pac. 315 (1895).
8. Warren Borough v. Daum, 73 Pa. 433 (873).
9. Alexander Hamilton Institute v. Jones, 234 Ill. App. 444 (1924) ; Petterson v. Pattberg, 248 N. Y. 86, 161 N. E. 428 (1928). See Wormser, The True Conception of Unilateral
Contracts (1916) 26 YALE L. J.136; I WI=USTON, CONTRACTS (1920) § 6o.
io. Antonelle v. Kennedy & Shaw Lumber Co., 140 Cal. 3o9, 73 Pac. 966 (i9o3) ; Patterson v. Meyerhofer, 204 N. Y. 96, 97 N. E. 472 (1912) ; 2 Wn.LISTON, CONTAACTS (1920)
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Since, however, the acts were all directed to one end, this eminently fair result
might more accurately have been attained by application of one of the various
solutions of the problem of revocability of unilateral offers after partial performance by the offeree.'1
PARTIES-PLAINTIFFS-SBSTITUTION
STATUTE AFTER STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

OF

PLAINTIFFS

UNDER

DEATH

HAS RUN-A Pennsylvania stat-

ute provides that for injuries resulting in death through defendant's negligence,
if no action has been begun by decedent in his lifetime, the persons entitled to
recover shall be "the husband, widow, children, or parents of the deceased, and
no other relatives

.

. . ".1 Moreover, the action must be brought within one

year after the death.' Decedent was killed in Pennsylvania. His parents were
the only beneficiaries within the statutory classes. The father alone brought
suit in New York, although the mother should properly have been joined. 3
After the limitation period had run, the father died, and the mother moved to
be substituted as plaintiff. Held, that denial of the motion was error. Murray
v. New York Ontario and Western R. R., N. Y. L. J., Nov. 19, 1934 (App.
Div. ist Dep't 1934).

An amendment to substitute or join a plaintiff after the statute of limitations has run will not be permitted where a new cause of action would be introduced or defendant would be materially prejudiced thereby. 4 Under the rule
that matters of substance are governed by the lex loci delicti,2 the court properly looked to the Pennsylvania statute and decisions in deciding the instant
case. The precise question here presented-the substitution of one statutory
beneficiary for another of the same class who has died after the limitation statute has run-has not been decided by Pennsylvania courts. It appears, however, that the right to recover pecuniary loss vests immediately upon the death
complained of. Thus, where a beneficiary begins an action and dies after the
one-year limitation period, such action survives to his personal representative
for the joint benefit of his estate and of more remote classes within the statute,"
RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 295. The last two authorities were cited by the
court in those sections dealing with conditions which presuppose the existence of a valid bilateral contract.
ii. Some suggested solutions are: (i) After the offeree has substantially performed the
contract then takes on a bilateral character. Los Angeles Traction Co. v. Wilshire, 135 Cal.
654, 67 Pac. io86 (19o2) ; (2) After partial performance the offeree is bound by a contract,
the duty of immediate performance of which is conditional on the full consideration being
given or tendered. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (932) § 45; (3) An implication in the offer
of a subsidiary offer to keep the main offer open for a reasonable length of time, which subsidiary offer is accepted by beginning performance. McGovney, Irrevocable Offers (1914)

§ 677;

27 HARV. L. REV. 644.

I. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1931) tit. 12, § 1602.

"And the sum recovered shall go to

them in the proportion they would take his or her personal estate in case of intestacy .
ibid. See, also, § 16oi.
2. Id. at § 1603.
3. Waltz v. Pennsylvania R. R., 216 Pa. 165, 65 At. 401 (.9o7) ; Holmes v. Pennsylvania
R. R., 220 Pa. 189, 69 Atl. 597 (39o8) ; see Davis v. Pennsylvania R. R., 34 Pa. Super. 388,
393 (197o).

4. Alessandrelli v. Arbogast, 209 Fed. 126 (M. D. Pa. 1913) (amendment from "widow"
to "mother" of decedent) ; La Bar v. New York, etc., R. R., 218 Pa. 261, 67 AtI. 413 (1907)
(widow in her own right to widow as administratrix) ; Rabinovitz v. Keystone Coal & Coke
Co., 3 West. Co. L. J.183 (Pa. 1914) (administrator to father of decedent).
5. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) §§ 391-397.
6. Fitzgerald v. Edison Electric Illuminating Co., 207 Pa. 118, 56 At. 350 (1903) ; McArdle v. Pittsburg Rys., 41 Pa. Super. 162 (1909).
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7
or for the sole benefit of his estate in absence of more remote statutory classes.
Moreover, it is not fatal for one parent alone to prosecute an action; an amendment of the record to add the other parent as plaintiff will be permitted after8
the statute has run, on the theory that no new cause of action is introduced,
and the amendment may even be made in the appellate court. Or, if no objection is made at trial, a judgment for one parent alone might be upheld,'" since,
under the statute, the other parent will nevertheless share in distribution."
personal represenThe propriety of the substitution as plaintiff of the father's
12
And, as defendant
tative could not have been questioned in the instant case.
will not be in the least prejudiced by the substitution of the mother, since the
same defenses will be available as could have been urged against the father,
and since the cause of action will remain the same, the decision of the court
seems unquestionably correct-although a contrary result was reached by a federal court on almost identical facts. 1

TAXATON-FEDERAL ESTATE TAX-EFFECT OF STATE LAWS ON FEDERAL

TAX LAWS-A Rhode Island statute' permits contestants to a will to modify

it by a compromise agreement and provides for the probate of the will as modified upon the approval of the Probate Court after a hearing in the presence of
all those interested. Under this statute, contestants of a will effected a compromise providing in part for a charitable bequest not contained in the original
will. The executor contended that the amount of the gift should be deducted
from the "gross value" of the estate in computing the tax payable under the
Act providing for the federal estate tax.2 Held, that the gift is not deductible
since it was not included in the original will of the testator. N. W. Smith, Executor, 31 B. T. A. No. 98 (1934).
In matters of descent, alienation and transfer of property, the federal

courts have been disposed to follow local law.3 But in order to obtain a some-

what uniform incidence of tax burden throughout the federal domain, the Su7. Haggerty v. Pittston Borough, 17 Pa. Super. II (igOi).
8. Waltz v. Pennsylvania R. R., 216 Pa. I65, 65 Atl. 401 (1907) ; Holmes v. Pennsylvania R. R., 220 Pa. 189, 69 Atl. 597 (i9o8) ; Sontum v. Mahoning and Shenango Ry., 226
Pa. 230, 75 Atl. 189 (igio) ; cf. Huntingdon and Broad Top R. R. v. Decker, 84 Pa. 419
(1877).
9. Hughes v. Williams, 17 Pa. Super. 229 (I9OI).
io. But see Davis v. Pennsylvania R. R., 34 Pa. Super. 388, 393 (19o7).
ii. See this portion of the statute quoted supra note i. For a discussion of the method
in which statutory beneficiaries who are not parties will share in distribution, see McArdle v.
Pittsburg Rys., 41 Pa. Super. 162, 166 (i9o9). A good discussion of the theory of pecuniary
loss as the measure of damages appears in Gaydos v. Domabyl, 3o Pa. 523, 530, 152 Atl. 549,
552 (1930).
12.

See cases cited supra notes 6 and 7.

Indeed, this
case would seem even stronger than the instant case in that there was no evidence there that
the statute of limitations had run when the mother sought to be substituted. Although the
court purported to be applying the Pennsylvania law in reaching its result, it seems clear that
that law was misinterpreted-for, as appears from the cases cited in this note, the Pennsylvania law on this problem at that time was the same as it is now. An excellent annotation
on the effect of the death of a beneficiary upon rights of action under a death statute appears
13 A. L. R. 225.
in Note (92)
13. Kluchnik v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 228 Fed. 880 (C. C. A. 2d, 1915).

GEN. LAWs, R. I. (1923) c. 363, § 18 et seq.
Revenue Act of 1926, 44 STAT. 9, 26 U. S. C. A. C.20 (1926). The section under
which the deduction was claimed is 44 STAT. 72 (1926), as amended, 26 U. S. C. A. § IO95
i.
2.

(Supp. 1933).

3. Warburton v. White, 176 U. S. 484 (1899) ; De Vaugn v. Hutchinson, 165 U. S. 566
(1896) ; Barton, The Effect of State Laws on Federal Tax Laws (1932) IO TAX MAG. II, 29.
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preme Court has considerably limited the influence of local laws on federal
taxing statutes unless the particular act expressly provides otherwise.4 Congress, too, has sometimes minimized the effect of state variations by drafting
the statutes to avoid the results of divergent legal theories.' Under the federal
estate tax, this result has been obtained by interpreting the Act as imposing
an excise on the interests of the testator which cease at his death, with deductions allowed for charitable bequests fie makes, while the interests succeeded to
by the beneficiaries are disregarded. 6 Therefore, since it is the death of the
testator which generates the tax upon his estate, i. e., the tax is imposed on
the property he possessed at his death, deductible bequests must have the same
generating source. 7 The language of the Rhode Island courts that the effect
of the statute involved in the instant case is to "embody the compromise in the
will . . . as if originally part of the will" 8 seems to endow charitable gifts

contained in the compromise with the necessary quality for deduction. But the
purpose of the statute itself would seem to negative this fiction in the present
situation. The Act concerns the beneficiaries only and attempts merely to
afford them the opportunity of avoiding the litigation incident to a will contest.9 This justifies the inference that the compromise agreements sanctioned
are intended to work not as a change in the testator's original intent, but as a
settlement of the conflicting interests arising thereunder. Therefore, since the
estate tax is imposed regardless of the interests of the beneficiaries, a situation
like that in the instant case is clearly outside the purview of the statute.

TAXATION-INcoME TAx-TAXABILITY OF INcOME FROM IRREVOCABLE
TRUST CREATED

BY TAXPAYER FOR WIFE'S BENEFIT IN

LIEU OF AL MONY-

Pursuant to an agreement-subsequently embodied in a divorce decree-entered
into with wife during the pendency of a divorce action, husband created a trust
fund. part of the annual income of which went to wife in lieu of alimony,
dower, and her other statutory interests in his estate. Held, that husband is
liable to income tax upon the income thus paid over to divorced wife because
it directly benefited him by discharging a legal obligation he was bound to perform.

Wilcuts v. Douglas, 73 F. (2d) 130 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934).

Husband agreed with wife that if she obtained a divorce and waived all
claims against him for alimony, dower, support and maintenance, he would
create a trust insuring her a designated income for life. Wife obtained a divorce which contained no provision for alimony, or other support, and husband
set up the trust. Held, that he could not be taxed on the income going to
divorced wife since he had parted with control over the trust fund and had
made it impossible to regain control. James H. Hyde, 31 B. T. A. 57 (1934).
Federal income tax legislation and decisions reveal a constant watchfulness
to curb attempts of taxpayers to avoid surtax brackets and yet retain the larger
4. Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U. S. 103 (1932); Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U. S. ioI (193o) ; see
Fidelity-Phila. Trust Co. v. McCaughn, 34 F. (2d) 6oo, 602 (C. C. A. 3d, 1929) ; (1930) 79U.
L. REv. 233.
5. See Note (1934) 34 Coi L. REv. 526, 527, in which these statutes are surveyed.
6. Y. M. C. A. v. Davis, 264 U. S. 47 (1923) ; Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41 (19oo).
7. See Mississippi Valley Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 72 F. (2d) 197, 199 (C. C. A. 8th,
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1934) ; Wear v. Commissioner, 65 F. (2d) 665, 667 (C. C. A. 3d, 1933).
8. Barber v. Westcott, 21 R. I. 355, 43 Atl. 844 (1899).
9. Since the statute speaks of contestants only and provides the circumstances under
which and the methods by which they may effect the compromise, the statement seems justifiable.
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privileges of ownership.' This has been accomplished by an expansion of the
concept of income 2 to include funds over which the taxpayer has "substantial"
control 3 or from which he derives important benefits.4 Thus, income received
by an assignee under a contract of assignment may be taxed to the assignor.5
Funds paid by one to relieve another's obligation have been held taxable to that
other.0 The settlor is taxable on the income of a trust revocable either by himself 7 or in conjunction with another," and even though he is under a disability
to revoke it during a particular tax year.' The Revenue Act taxes to the settlor
the income of an irrevocable trust created to pay premiums of insurance on the
settlor's life.' 0 The Douglas case applied this new concept of income to irrevocable trusts in general." Since income taxes have become the largest single
source of revenue to the federal government, the result in all these situations is
equally desirable. The Hyde case, opposed in result to the Douglas case, 12 confines itself too strictly to the letter of the Revenue Act which, with the exception of the aforementioned funded insurance trust, nowhere mentions taxability
of a settlor on the income of an irrevocable trust."3 The trust provisions of
I. "One can read in the revisions of the revenue acts the record of the Government's
endeavor to keep pace with the fertility of invention whereby taxpayers had contrived to
keep the larger benefits of ownership and be relieved of the attendant burdens." Cardozo, J.,
in Burnet v. Wells, 289 U. S. 67o, 675 (1933).
2. Traditionally, the term has meant a gain or profit proceeding from the property and
received or draw); by the taxpayer for his separate use, benefit and disposal. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189, 207 (1920). See also Note (1932) 45 HARV. L. REV. io72.
3. ". . . taxation is not so much concerned with the refinements of title as it is with
the actual command over the property taxed." Holmes, J., in Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U. S.
376, 378 (1930).
4. "Liability may rest upon the enjoyment by the taxpayer of privileges and benefits so
substantial and important as to make it reasonable and just to deal with him as if he were
the real owner, and to tax him on that basis." Cardozo, J., in Burnet v. Wells, 289 U. S. 670,
678 (1933).
5. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U. S. 111 (1930) (assignment of salary, current or future) ; Burnet
v. Leininger, 285 U. S. 136 (1931) (assignment by partner) ; Ward v. Commissioner, 58 F.
(2d) '757 (C. C. A. 9th, 1932) cert4 denied, 287 U. S. 656 (1932) (assignment of rent) ;
Rosenwald v. Commissioner, 33 F. (2d) 423 (C. C. A. 7th, 1929) cert. denied, 280 U. S. 599
The concept has not extended to an assignment by a
(1929) (assignment of dividends).
cestui of his right to receive trust income, since his right in the income producing trust is no
broader than his right to receive the income. Commissioner v. Field, 42 F. (2d) 82o (C. C.
A. 2d, 193o). For a complete discussion of the assignment cases see: Surrey, Assignment
of Income and Related Devices; Choice of Taxable Person (1933) 33 Co. L. REY. 79o.
6. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U. S. 716 (1929) ; United States v. Boston
& Maine Ry., 279 U. S.732 (1929).
7. Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U. S. 376 (193o).
8. Reinecke v. Smith, 289 U. S. 172 (933).
9. Dupont v. Commissioner, 289 U. S. 685 (1933). This case effectually overrules the
decisions in Langley v. Commissioner, 6I F. (2d) 796 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932), and Lewis v.
White, 56 F. (2d) 390 (D. Mass. 1932), as to which see (1933) 46 HAzv. L. REv. 523;
(933) 81 U. OF PA. L. REv. 345.
io. § 167 (a) (3), Revenue Act of 1932, 45 STAT. 840, 26 U. S. C, A. § 2167. This section first appeared in § 219 (h) of the 1924 act, which section was held constitutional in Burnet v. Wells, 289 U. S. 67o (1933). For discussion and criticism of this case see (1933) 22
GEoRGErowx L. J. 114; (933) 47 HARv.L. REv. 137; (934) 28 IL. L. REv. 704; (1933) 32
MIcH. L. REv. 123.
ii. Since the court concurred in the setting up of the trust, it is entirely possible that no
tax avoidance motive was present in the particular case. However, the situation is a sufficiently common one to point the way to a fertile field for tax avoidance, unless the result of
the Douglas case is made to obtain.
12. In both cases the trust income served to relieve the settlor of a marital obligation
recognized in the Douglas case in the court's decree and the contract, and in the Hyde case
in the contract alone.
13. The board referred to 45 STAT. 84o (1932), 26 U. S. C A. § 2167, which purports to
make taxable to the grantor the income of the revocable trusts and of the irrevocable insurance trusts mentioned in note io mupra.
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the Revenue Act, merely purporting to list those tax avoidance trust devices
which have been called to the attention of Congress, 14 are preventive in nature,
not exclusive. Consequently, the Douglas case seems commendable as another
instance in which the court has blocked tax evasion by adopting a statutory
construction more nearly following the intent of Congress in a situation provided for in only general terms.'

TRUSTS-LANDLORD AND TENANT-DEPOSIT UNDER A LEASEHOLD AGREEMENT AS A DEBT OR A TRUST-Pursuant to the terms of a leasehold agreement,'

lessee deposited with lessor $15,ooo as security for performance. The agreement provided that lessor was to keep the $15,ooo in a separate saving fund
account, to pay the lessee the interest received, and to exhibit to lessee the bank
book showing a balance of $15,ooo. If lessor failed to show the book, lessee
was not required to pay further rentals until the amount withheld equalled
$i5,ooo. Lessor made the saving fund deposit in his own name in defendant
bank, which had extended loans to him before it had notice of plaintiff's interest
in the deposit. After receiving notice the bank appropriated this deposit as
security for the lessor's debt. Plaintiff, claiming under the lessee, sued the
bank for the deposit. Held, that the leasehold deposit was a debt rather than a
trust, and bank had the right to app-opriate it. Handle v. The Real EstateLand Title & Trust Co., 316 Pa. 1I6, 173 Atl. 313 (I934).
Where the intention of the parties is not otherwise apparent, the courts
have made the method of interest payment a determining factor in deciding
whether a transaction created a debt or a trust. An agreement to pay stipulated
interest indicates a debt,2 while an agreement to pay whatever interest the
money will earn indicates a trust.3 In the instant case the agreement between
14. Referring to what later became § 219 (h) of the Revenue Act of 1924, the Report
of the Committee on Ways and Means in the House of Representatives said, "Trusts have
been used to evade taxes by means of provisions allowing the distribution of income to the
grantor or its use for his benefit. The purpose of this subdivision of the bill is to stop this
evasion." H. R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., Ist Sess., p. 21. Cf. note i, sipra.
I5. For example, Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U. S. 732 (1929), cited
note 6 supra; Lucas v. Earl, 281 U. S. Iii (I93O), cited note 5 supra; Burnet v. Leininger,
285 U. S. 136 (932), cited note 5 supra.

i.The following excerpts from the agreement contain the relevant portions of the lease:
"Lessee agrees to and does hereby deposit with Lessor the sum of Fifteen Thousand
($15,Oo)
Dollars in cash, which Lessor agrees to deposit to his credit and keep in a
separate saving fund account in a bank to be selected by him, and agrees to pay to Lessee
the interest received on said account when and as received, which interest shall be the
prevailing rate, and which sum shall be security for prompt and punctual payment of the
rent, . ..
Upon any default on part of Lessee, the Lessor shall be entitled to apply
said sum or sums deposited hereunder or any part thereof, at the option of Lessor towards the payment of minimum rents ...
"Lessor agrees, prior to default by Lessee of terms herein, to exhibit to Lessee, or
his agent, a Savings Fund Book showing deposit of $15,000 to credit of Lessor when
minimum monthly rentals are paid and exhibition is then demanded and if at any such
time Lessor is unable to do so, Lessee shall not be required to pay to Lessor further
rentals reserved herein until amount withheld equals $i5,ooo, when payments shall be
resumed, . . ."
2. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Puritan Motors Corp., 244 Mass. 259, 138 N. E. 321 (1923);
Pittsburg National Bank of Commerce v. McMurray, 98 Pa. 538 (I88I) ; RESTATEMENT,
TRUSTS (Tent. Draft, 1930) § i5,g; see (i9o9) 57 U. OF PA. L. REv. 273.
3. Allen v. Pollard, io9 Tex. 536, 212 S. W. 468 (I919) ; Keller v. Washington, 83 W.
Va. 659, 98 S. E. 88o (igig).
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the lessor and the lessee was to pay such interest as the money earned.4 An
even stronger indication that the parties intended a trust is contained in the
provision that the fund was to be deposited and kept in a separate savings fund
account.5 This provision has a sensible meaning if the transaction created a
trust, but has no reasonable purpose if it is construed as a debt.6 Most of the
leasehold deposit cases which have come before the courts have been held to
create debtor-creditor relationships, 7 but obviously there is nothing peculiar to
the leasehold deposit which should give rise to a presumption of a debt., The
court in the instant case apparently based its decision on the clause which stated
that if the lessor did not exhibit savings fund book showing $15,ooo balance,
"Lessee shall not be required to pay to Lessor further rentals . . ." The
court interpreted this clause to mean that lessee's only remedy was to withhold
the rent,9 and from this reasoned that lessor therefore could not be guilty of a
conversion and qo had the right to use the money unrestrictedly. It is submitted that this clause in the lease granted lessee a privilege, i. e., that of withholding rent, and contained no words of limitation, restricting lessee to this
course of action. It appears more likely that the purpose of this clause was to
provide lessee with an easier means of ascertaining and proving a breach of
trust duties by lessor and was not intended to grant to lessor the right to withdraw the money and use it for his own purposes. Moreover, the provision of
the agreement that lessor should keep the $I5,OOO in a separate saving fund
account seems clearly inconsistent with the idea that the lessor could use the
money in any way he wished. The extent to which the court was in fact influenced by the bank's extension of credit in reliance 10 on this deposit is doubtful. The lessee's allowing the lessor to deposit the money in his own name was
a representation that the lessor was the owner of the deposit and it may be that
there would be an equitable estoppel in this case even had the court construed
this as a trust.1
4. ". . . and agrees to pay to Lessee the interest received on said account when and as
received, which interest shall be the prevailing rate, . . ." The clause stating it shall be
the prevailing rate makes the meaning of this passage slightly ambiguous. The purpose of
this statement apparently is to require that the money be placed in a bank which is paying the
prevailing rate on saving fund deposits. This clause modifies but does not change the previous
statement that the lessor is to pay the interest received on said account when and as received.
5. United States v. Butterworth-Judson Corp., 267 U. S. 387 (I925) ; Matter of Atlas,
217 App. Div. 38, 216 N. Y. Supp. 490 (4th Dep't 1926) ; see Levinson v. Shapiro, 238 App.
Div. I58, r6o, 263 N. Y. Supp. 585, 587 (ist Dep't 1933).

6. The only possible reason, if the transaction created a debt, is that lessee thought he
would have a better chance of getting his money back if it were kept intact in a separate
account. However, as lessee's chance of getting his money back depends directly on lessor's
solvency, it seems likely that the parties would have chosen a more adequate index of lessor's potential solvency if that had been their intention.
7. In re Banner, 149 Fed. 936 (S. D. N. Y. i9O7); Mendelson-Silverman, Inc. v. Malco
Trading Corp., 262 N. Y. 621, I88 N. E. 92 (1933) ; Levinson v. Shapiro, 238 App. Div. i58,
263 N. Y. Supp. 585 (Ist Dep't 1933).
8. In fact if there were to be any presumption, it would seem to be to the contrary. The
purpose of a leasehold deposit is to secure the payment of the rent, and the deposit is equally
good security whether it is a debt or a trust. The interest of the lessee is that his deposit be
returned to him, and generally speaking, a trust will be much safer than a debt. As a trust is
as advantageous to both parties as a debt, and as it is more desirable for the lessee than a
debt, it would seem that the parties would generally prefer a trust.
9. Instant case at 120.
IO.The lower court found as a conclusion of law that the existence of the deposit at the
time of the extension of the loans gave rise to a presumption that the bank relied on the
deposit in extending the loans.
ii. Cf. Goldberg v. Parker, 87 Conn. 99, 87 Atl. 555 (913) ; Farmers Savings Bank v.
Pugh, 204 Iowa 580, 215 N. W. 652 (927); Bergin v. Blackwood, i41 Minn. 325, 17o N. W.
5o8 (919) ; 46 L. R. A. (N. s.) IO97; REsTATEmENT, TRusTs (Tent. Draft, 1933) § 304.

